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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INSURANCE-DISABILITY INSURER'S REFUSAL TO PAY GIVES RISE TO
ACTION IN ToRT-Fletcher v. Western National Life Insurance Co.,
10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
Plaintiff suffered a totally disabling back injury in an industrial ac-
cident. His insurance policy with the defendant company provided for
benefits of $150 per month for thirty years for total disability due to
injury. But if the disability were due to sickness, the benefits were
to continue for only two years. The defendant had received exten-
sive medical information confirming the accidental cause of the disa-
blement. To avoid full payment, however, it attempted to pay under
the limited two-year sickness provision, then stopped payments alto-
gether, fabricated a story about a previously existing condition and
demanded return of the payments it-had made. Later, the company of-
fered to permit the plaintiff to retain the past payments in return for
his surrender of the policy. While the payments were withheld the
plaintiff's family subsisted on macaroni, beans, and potatoes; their
utilities were shut off; a daughter had to leave school; and they lost
property in which they had invested.
Plaintiff brought suit to obtain a declaration of the defendant's lia-
bility under the policy and to recover damages for emotional injuries
caused by the defendant's conduct. The defendant stipulated its lia-
bility under the policy, and a cause of action for intentional infliction
of emotional distress was submitted to the jury. Following a jury
award of $60,000 compensatory and $650,000 punitive damages, the
trial judge reduced the punitive damages to $190,000. A primary
issue on appeal was whether the action was one at contract rather
than tort. Only a tort theory would allow plaintiff to recover damages
for mental suffering or punitive damages. The appellate court af-
firmed. Held: Despite the contractual nature of the insurance policy,
the action was one at tort. Fletcher v. Western National Life Insur-
ance Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).
I. THE BORDERLAND OF TORT AND CONTRACT
Classification of a cause of action as tort or contract is important
because of the different rules of jurisdiction, statutes of limitation,
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wrongful death, and damages.' In Fletcher, a contract measure of
damages would probably have permitted only an award of the stipu-
lated policy benefits, while the tort measure of damages permitted an
additional award of $250,000.2
Often a plaintiff will attempt to plead his action as either tort or
contract to gain the most favorable rule.3 However, there never has
been complete freedom to classify an action according to the plain-
tiffs desire. Generally accepted broad definitions of tort and breach
of contract do exist. 4 Contractual duties are owed only to parties to a
contract and are created by the consent of the parties to the terms of
the contract. Duties that sound in tort are owed to persons at large
and are created by the law to promote social policy, regardless of the
parties' consent. 5
Often, though, a contract will create a relationship that gives rise to
duties imposed by law in addition to those duties arising out of the
contract. For example, a doctor may voluntarily accept a contractual
duty, for breach of which a contract action will lie, and the law will
add a duty of due care for breach of which a tort action will lie.6 Such
cases fall between the categories in a gray area called the "borderland
of tort and contract."' 7 Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted
1. Thornton, The Ela.stic Concept of Tort and Contract as Applied by the Courts of
New York, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 196 (1948).
2. The measure of contract damages is usually narrower than tort damages, since
contract damages are limited to those reasonably foreseeable at the time of contract.
Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1845); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
oF- DAMAGES 560-81 (1935). Damages for mental suffering generally are not re-
coverable. Westwater v. Rector of Grace Church, 140 Cal. 339, 73 P. 1055 (1903). Puni-
tive damages are also precluded. Crogan v. Metz, 47 Cal. 2d 328, 303 P.2d 1029 (1956).
In tort, both compensatory and punitive damages are recoverable. Arcadia, Cal., Ltd. v.
Herbert, 54 Cal. 2d 328, 5 Cal. Rptr. 686, 353 P.2d 294 (1960).,Washington is one of
only four states that does not allow punitive damages. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 2
(4th ed. 1971).
The difference between tort and contract damages is of great importance in Fletcher.
In the instant case $190,000 of the $250,000 were punitive damages and the remaining
$60.000 compensatory damages were for mental suffering. Opening Brief for Appellant
at 2. Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 788
(1970). Both of these amounts would have been precluded if the action had been
categorized as a breach of contract.
3. Addis v. Gramophone Co. Ltd.. 119091 A.C. 488, 492.
4. Estep v. Budger Mfg. Co., 164 Cal. App. 2d 119, 330 P.2d 298 (1958).
5. P. WINi-IELD. THiE PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORT 40 (1931).
6. Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d 711(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 882 (1957). Forz
good discussion of the tort-contract question in a variety of areas see Comment, Exem.
plary Damage.% in Contract Cases, 7 WILLAMETTE L. J. 137 (1971).
7. W. PROSSER, SEIECrEDTOICSON THE LAWvoF TORTS 380 (1954).
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rule for determining the classification of these borderland actions.8 A
case may be classified as a contract action for one purpose and as a
tort action for another. 9 This flexibility leads to a greater probability
of differing results on an issue such as the classification of an action
for the nonpayment of insurance benefits.
Although there has been no special historical development in the
area of insurer-insured relationships, the majority of jurisdictions that
have considered the classification of nonpayment of benefits have clas-
sified it as a breach of contract action for traditional contract dam-
ages.10 Although classifying the action as one for breach of contract,
the Washington Supreme Court is one of only a few courts which nev-
ertheless have taken an expansive view of foreseeable damages in al-
lowing recovery for such elements as pain and suffering." However,
8. Id. at 430-36. Prosser suggests a misfeasance-tort, nonfeasance-contract dichot-
omy, with numerous exceptions. Id. at 387-442. Some courts have held that if the action
cannot be maintained without pleading and proving the contract, then the action is one
for breach of contract. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wick, 288 S.W.2d 899 (Tex. Ct. App. 1956).
Other courts look for the gravamen of the complaint. See, e.g., Quitmeyer v. Theroux,
144 Mont. 302, 395 P.2d 965 (1964). Still others permit the plaintiff to make a choice.
See, e.g., Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952). Many classifications are
made on the basis of particular historical developments, such as the special duties of
common carriers. P. WINFIELD, THE PROVINCE OF THE LAW OF TORT 60-62 (193 1).
9. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 92, at 621-22 (4th ed. 1971); Guest, Tort or Con-
tract?, 3 U. MALAYA L. REV. 191,222 (1961); Thornton, The Elastic Concept of Tort and
Contract as Applied by the Courts of New York, 14 BROOK. L. REV. 196 (1948).
10. The traditional measure of contract damages limits recovery to policy benefits
plus interest. Comment, Damages Assessed Against Insurers for Wrongful Failure to
Pay, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 466, 467 (1968). Of factual similarity to Fletcher was Hass
v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 70 Ohio App. 322, 41 N.E.2d 263 (1941), where the plain-
tiff sued for mental suffering and related economic loss following nonpayment on a dis-
ability policy. The action was found to be at contract, and damages were limited to the
policy benefits plus interest. Other cases considering the nonpayment of benefits all
make the same classification. Blackman v. Independent Life & Accident Ins. Co., 299
S.C. 54, 91 S.E.2d 709 (1956) (life insurance); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bejcy,
201 F.2d 163 (6th Cir. 1953) (fire insurance); Liberty Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Stringfellow,
38 Ala. App. 594, 92 So.2d 924 (1956) (burial insurance).
1I. In effect, the Washington court has closed the hiatus between proximate results
and foreseeable results. In Wilkins v. Grays Harbor Community Hosp., 71 Wn.2d 178,
427 P.2d 716 (1967), the plaintiff brought a breach of contract action on a medical
service contract. The defendant insurer had refused to permit exploratory surgery cov-
ered by the contract. A nine-month delay in surgery resulted in added damage from
stomach cancer and additional pain and suffering. Rather than limit the damages to the
proven medical expense of $3,734 that was owed on the contract, the court permitted an
additional $40,000 for pain and suffering and other general damages. The court rea-
soned that such damages were foreseeable at the time of contracting.
A few other courts have reached the same result with a liberal application of foreseea-
bility. Miholevich v. Mid-West Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 216 Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202
(1933). Pennslyvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Messenger, 29 A.2d
653 (Md. Ct. App. 1943). The California courts have taken tentative steps toward a
more liberal application of the foreseeability rule, although not in the nonpayment of
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punitive damages are not available in Washington.12 Some states have
classified it as a breach of contract but have used statutes to supple-
ment damages with attorney's fees and a percentage penalty.' 3 None
of these authorities was presented to the court,' 4 and Fletcher be-
came the first case in which such an action was classified as a tort.' 5
II. THE COURT'S RATIONALE
The court's conclusion that the action sounded in tort' 6 seems to
benefits area. Comment, Recovery fir Mental A nguish friom Breach of Contract: The
Need for an Enabling Statute, 5 CAlIAi. WES I ERN L. REV. 88 (1968).
12. See note 2. Mfpra.
13. 3 J. APPLEMAN. INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 1601-05 (1967). Califor-
nia's only statute in the area limits liability to the amount stated in the policy. CAI. INS.
CODE § 10111 (West 1955). There is no indication that this applies to tort actions
involving an insurance policy. Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921.71
Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968).
14. Opening Brief for Appellant, Brief for Respondent, and Reply Brief for Appel-
lant, Fletcher v. Western Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 89 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1970).
15. One other decision may have considered this a tort action. Federal Life Ins. Co.
v. Frazer, 192 Ind. 565, 137 N.E. 273 (1922). The court did not discuss the borderland
issue, but added 5'1 damages to the award. This might have been a penal sum indicative
of a tort. However, the court's holding that the judgment was affirmed a.s of the date oJ
AIuli.%.ion of the case suggests a contract action with 51 interest. A statute permitting
up to 8, interest on judgments supports such an analysis. IND. ANN. SIAl..
19-12-102 (1964).
The California courts previously had not directly considered the tort-contract issue in
the context of an action for nonpayment of benefits. In Reichert v. General Ins. Co.. 68
Cal. 2d 882, 69 Cal. Rptr. 321, 442 P.2d 377 (1968), the plaintiff had originally pleaded
tort elements to his suit for damages caused by nonpayment of fire insurance. His
amended complaint, however, dropped those elements. As Fletcher noted, the ma-
jority and dissent in Reichert seemed to assume the action was for breach of contract.
but never directly considered the issue. Fletcher. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 402. 89 Cal. Rptr.
at 94.
Wetherbee v. United Ins. Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 921, 71 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1968). had
considered the defense that nonpayment of insurance benefits was a breach of contract
action with damages limited to policy benefits. The court permitted tort damages for
fraududent inducement of the plaintiff to enter into the contract, thereby avoiding the
nonpayment problem.
16. The court considered this the most troublesome aspect of the case. Fletcher. 10
Cal. App. 3d at 400, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 92. However, the issue was neither identified as a
borderland question nor analyzed with borderland principles, probably because none of
the briefs presented such an approach.
The issue was further obscured because the defendant presented it as a question of
causation, asking the court to consider two aspects of its conduct separately when deter-
mining actual causation. The defendant asked that two threatening letters be considered
as one aspect of its conduct and the non-payment of benefits as a separate aspect.
The defense was willing to concede that the letters were potentially tortious conduct,
but argued that they caused no actual injury. It then contended that the nonpayment of
benefits was the only conduct that might have caused harm. But this conduct, they
argued, was a breach of contract and could not be the basis of a tort.
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depend entirely on an extension of Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. 17
In Crisci, the California Supreme Court held that an insurer owes its
insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing to do
nothing to deprive the insured of the benefits of the policy.18 In the
case of a liability insurer this includes the duty to act reasonably and in
good faith to settle claims against the insured by third parties. Viola-
tion of that duty sounds in tort.19 After discussing Crisci, the Fletcher
court extended these principles to the disability insurance case before
it.20 In meeting the contract argument the court applied the rule that
when conduct clearly constitutes a breach of contract the court will
not be precluded from further inquiry into the defendant's conduct. If
that conduct was tortious a tort action will lie.21 The court in Fletcher
had little difficulty finding the familiar tort of "intentional infliction
of emotional distress." 22
It has been suggested that the court held that a tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress was not applicable. 23 However, on
close analysis it appears that the court did apply such a tort. 24 This
17. 66 Cal. 2d 425,58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173 (1967).
18. Id., 58 Cal. Rptr, at 16-17, 426 P.2d at 176-77.
19. Id., 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 18, 426 P.2d at 176, 178.
20. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94:
We think that, similarly, the implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing
imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to threaten to withhold or actually
withhold payments, maliciously and without probable cause, for the purpose of in-
juring its insured by depriving him of the benefits of the policy. We think that, as in
Crisci, the violation of that duty sounds in tort notwithstanding that it also consti-
tutes a breach of contract.
21. Although such a rule has not been articulated, it seems implicit in the basic anal-
ysis of borderland cases. See Eads v. Marks, 39 Cal. 2d 807, 249 P.2d 257 (1952). See
also note 6 and accompanying text, supra.
22. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94:
We hold, therefore, that defendants' threatened and actual bad faith refusals to
make payments under the policy, maliciously employed by defendants in concert
with false and threatening communications directed to plaintiff for the purpose of
causing him to surrender his policy or disadvantageously settle a nonexistent dis-
pute is essentially tortious in nature and is conduct that may legally be the basis for
an action for damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
23. See 4 Loyola (L.A.) L. REV. 208, 215 (1971). Apparently this analysis is based on
the belief that the court used "may" in a sense of probability rather than in a permissive
sense when it said: "[D] efendants' threatened and actual bad faith refusals to make
payments ... is conduct that may legally be the basis for an action for damages for in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress." Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal.
Rptr. at 93 (emphasis added).
24. In context it is likely that the court made a positive holding rather than an
equivocation. The defense had argued that even if there was a prima facie case of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress, the breach of contract element would preclude
finding a tort. See note 16, supra. In essence they were saying, "This conduct may not be
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tort had not previously been used for nonpayment of benefits, 25 but
Fletcher's extreme facts made it a likely setting for an extension. The
tort has been a growing protection for peace of mind in various fields;2 6
Fletcher simply extended it into a new area.
Rather than base its decision solely on the intentional infliction of
emotional distress, the court identified a second tort of "interference
with a protected property interest. '2 7 A tort of this name was neither
presented at trial nor discussed in the briefs. It has been suggested that
Fletcher developed a new, unlitigated tort which was not argued on
appeal.2 8
A better analysis is that "interference with a protected property in-
terest" was used as a generic name covering a wide class of injuries to
property,2 9 just as "interference with the person" covers a wide class
of injuries to people.30 Although never identified, the specific tort in
Fletcher which falls within the general class seems to be a breach of
an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing identified in
Crisci.
The Fletcher court had laid the groundwork for such an extension
the basis for a tort." The court resolved the matter by saying that indeed it may be the
basis for a tort.
The key sentence began: "We hold therefore ....- Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401.89
Cal. Rptr. at 93 (emphasis added). If the court had simply meant to discuss probabilities.
it would have included its remarks in general discussion rather than in the holding. Fur-
ther support for this analysis comes from the extensive space devoted to a discussion of
this tort both before and after the holding. Id. at 394-401, 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88-92. 95.
25. Intentional infliction of emotional distress has been applied in the area of settle-
ment practices, but never for simple nonpayment of benefits. See Annot., 39 A.L.R.3d
739,767-73 (1971).
26. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 12 (4th ed. 1971).
27. We further hold that, independent of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, such conduct on the part of a disability insurer constitutes a tortious
interference with a protected property interest of its insured for which damages
may be recovered to compensate for all detriment ....
Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93. It is not clear why the court went
on to make this dual holding. It may have done this out of uncertainty over the validity
of finding intentional infliction of emotional distress. See note 23, supra. Or it may have
done this out of a desire to extend greater protection to insureds. See note 58 and ac-
companying text, infra. The court suggested that it did this to gain greater respect for the
law and the judicial process by emphasizing economic rather than emotional injury.
Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
28. See 4 LovoYA (L.A.) L. Rrv. 208. 225 (197 1).
29. Prosser classifies various torts, including trespass to land, trespass to chattels.
and conversion, as "interference with property." W. PROSSER. LAW OF ToRrS §§ 13-15
(4th ed. 1971). Such a broad category might also include torts involving intangible
economic property such as injurious falsehood and interference with contractual
relations.
30. Id. §§ 7-12.
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of Crisci when it reasoned that the duty of good faith and fair dealing
extended to disability insurers in general. 31 An analysis of the prob-
able elements of the "new" tort suggests that they are similar to the
elements in Crisci.32 The only explanation for this tort was that it ap-
propriately placed the emphasis on economic loss, which is consistent
with the emphasis in Crisci.33 If such an analysis is correct, this "new"
tort is not new after all.
Two lines of reasoning were employed in Fletcher to support an
extension of this "new" tort into the disability insurance field. The first
was based on the similarity of Crisci to the present case. 34 The second
was based on an analogy to the interference with contractual rela-
tions. 35 Both of these are weak support for such an extension.
The belief that the situation in a liability settlement dispute is sim-
ilar to the situation in a disability payment dispute fails to recognize a
fundamental difference in the relationships involved. There is an im-
plied duty of good faith and fair dealing in Crisci and other settlement
dispute cases only because the insurer has complete control of the in-
sured's rights and therefore stands in an almost fiduciary role.36 A
disability insurer has control of no such rights; he stands more in an
adversary role. An extension of the duty may be sound policy, but it
is a far-reaching extension to make without consideration of such a
fundamental difference.
The second rationale, that of an analogy to intentional interference
3 1. Fletcher, l0 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
32. In Crisci, as in Fletcher, it was the insurance company's failure to give the in-
sured the protection for which he contracted that constituted tortious conduct. One dif-
ference was that there had to be a bad faith refusal in Fletcher, while in Crisci the
standard was reasonableness. Crisci, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16-17, 426 P.2d 176-77. See text
accompanying note 60, infra.
33. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94. The primary injury empha-
sized in Crisci was the loss of the benfits of the policy. Crisci, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16, 426
P.2d at 176. Fletcher extended this to the disability insurer: "[T] he implied-in-law duty
of good faith and fair dealing imposes upon a disability insurer a duty not to threaten to
withhold or actually withhold payments, maliciously and without probable cause, for the
purpose of injuring its insured by depriving him of the benefits ofthe policy." Fletcher,
10 Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (emphasis added).
34. Fletcher, 10Cal. App. 3d at 401, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93.
35. Id. at 402-03, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94-95.
36. The Crisci line of authority goes back to Keeton, Liability Insurance and Re-
sponsibility for Settlement, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1136 (1954), which noted that the duty
is based on the special relationship involving exclusive control by the insurer. Crisci, 58
Cal. Rptr. at 18, 426 P.2d at 178. Otherjurisdictions have noted that the special duty of a
liability insurer is based on a fiduciary or agent role. Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wn.
App. 167, 473 P.2d 193 (1970). Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Kornbluth, 28 Colo. App. 194,
471 P.2d 609 (1970).
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with contractual relations, is also weak. It is true that a stranger to
the contract would have been liable in tort for interfering with the
contractual relations of the insured, and at first glance it does seem
persuasive that a party to a contract should not be held to a lesser
standard of conduct than a stranger. But application of such reasoning
would make a party to any contract a potential defendant at tort for
breach of the contract. 37 To the contrary, the law has drawn
a valid distinction between a breach of contract by one of the con-
tracting parties and a breach induced by a third party. 38
Although the court's rationale for the Crisci extension is weak, the
extension is partially justified by an analysis of the special insurer-
insured relationship that the court discussed in another context.39 An
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be applicable due
to the great disparity in the economic situations and bargaining abili-
ties of the parties. The Fletcher court noted that:40
These considerations are particularly cogent in disability insurance.
The very risks insured against presuppose that if and when a claim is
made, the insured will be disabled and in strait financial circumstances
and, therefore, particularly vulnerable to oppressive tactics on the part
of an economically powerful entity.
Such factors suggest the judicial implication of a covenant of good
faith and fair dealing even without a fiduciary relationship. 41
37. 4 LOYOLA (L.A.) L. REV. 208, 227(1971).
38. A party to a contract cannot be a defendant for interference with contractual
relations. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 129 (4th ed. 1971). To change that rule would
eradicate the rule of damages unique to contract law. Canister Co. v. National Can
Corp., 96 F. Stipp. 273 (D. Del. 1951).
There are significant differences between the insured-insurer and insured-stranger
relationships. If the insured cannot set the contractual rights and liabilities, at least he
can choose the insurer with whom he deals. There is no such control over the insured's
relationship with a stranger. The insured already has a breach of contract remedy against
the insurer; a tort action is needed for protection against a stranger.
39. The court noted the rule that a special relationship of parties may be significant in
finding a tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress and that insurance companies
stand in such a relationship to their insureds. Fleicher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 403-04. 89
Cal. Rptr. at 95.
40- Id. at 404, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95.
41. The quasi-public nature of the insurance industry has led to creation ofa special
duty owed to third parties injured by insureds holding liability policies. Barrera v. State
Farm Mut., 71 Cal. 2d 659, 79 Cal. Rptr. 106, 456 P.2d 674 (1969).
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III. THE NEW RULE AND PUBLIC POLICY
Although the court did not touch upon them, there are strong
policy reasons to hold an insurance company liable at tort for a bad
faith refusal to pay an insured. The insured public benefits from the
greater capability of a tort measure of damages both to compensate
the insured and to deter companies from denying future claims. Con-
tract damages are inadequate in both respects.
The insured who has been injured by a wrongful failure to pay is
inadequately compensated when limited to a contract action due to
the requirement that damages be reasonably foreseeable at time of
contract. 42 The usual application of this rule means that there can be
no recovery for the very losses the insured hoped to avoid.43 One solu-
tion is a reasonable expansion of contract damages as is the situation
in Washington. 44 The more comprehensive solution is to use the tort
measure of damages allowing compensation for all injuries. 45
A further policy advantage of tort damages is their ability to deter
future bad faith-nonpayments through the use of-punitive damages in
those jurisdictions which permit them. Without compensatory or puni-
tive damages the insurer has little to lose by denying claims of persons
whom it believes can be overcome by pressure. 46 The defendant's em-
ployee in Fletcher claimed that he would do the same thing again with
similar facts.47 Punitive damages would remedy such practices.48
42. See note 2, supra.
43. See note 10, supra. The injustice of applying the rule by limiting damages to
policy benefits is seen in Scottish Union & Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Benjcy, 201 F.2d 163
(6th Cir. 1953). There was evidence that following the nonpayment of benefits the in-
sured became ill, suffered loss of time and money, incurred medical expenses, and suf-
fered mental anguish. The court reversed a jury verdict awarding special damages,
ruling that damages must be limited to the policy benefits plus interest.
44. See note 11, supra.
45. Use of the tort measure of damages would compensate for all the injuries proxi-
mately caused by the defendant's conduct, including those injuries that could not rea-
sonably be called foreseeable. This would avoid tortured extensions of the concept of
foreseeability.
46. If the insured fails to act after denial of payment, the company pays nothing. If
the insured goes to court and wins a contract action, the company will only have to pay
the policy benefits. To save trial costs it can always admit its liability at the last minute,
as the company tried to do in Fletcher. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 385, 89 Cal. Rptr. at
82. An insurer would not be concerned about extraneous factors such as losing a renewal
on someone like Mr. Fletcher.
47. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 408-09, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 99.
48. The Fletcher decision itself had an impact within the insurance industry. Letter
from Corporate Headquarters, Uniguard Insurance Group, to Claims Managers, Nov.
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The experience of at least one state with a statute governing bad
faith nonpayments suggests that there is significant abuse. 49 It is log-
ical to expect more abuse in those states which permit companies to
employ such practices with impunity. New solutions such as Fletcher
are necessary to aid those who are injured and to deter those who in-
jure them.
If adopted elsewhere, Fletcher's impact would be greatest in those
states that currently restrict damages to the policy limits in cases of
nonpayment. 50 States like Washington which permit a wide measure
of contract damages would be less affected, 51 as would those states
that supplement contract damages by statute.52 Analysis of the elements
of the two Fletcher torts suggests that each has potential application
in particular kinds of cases.
Presumably the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
could apply whenever the prima facie case was met. This would re-
quire: outrageous conduct, intention or recklessness, extreme emo-
tional distress, and actual and proximate causation.53 The fact pattern
of each instance of nonpayment should be examined to determine if it
has these elements. The principle limitations of this tort are the re-
quirements of outrageous conduct and extreme emotional harm.
Wrongful failures to pay are often less than outrageous and result in
economic rather than emotional harm.5 4 Beyond the nonpayment of
benefits cases, it seems likely that this tort could be used by third par-
ties injured by liability policy holders.5 5 However, an insurer might
25, 1970, a copy of which is on file with the Washington Law Review. The letter discusses
Fletcher and points out the need for continued vigilance to avoid acts of bad faith that
might lead to compensatory or punitive damages.
49. Clark Center, Inc. v. National Life & Accident Ins. Co.. 245 Ark. 567. 433
S.W.2d 151 (1968).
50. See note 10, supra.
51. See notes II and 45,. upra.
52. See note 13. supra.
53. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 394, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88. A fifth element, privilege,
is best viewed as a defense. It permits the insurer to deny or attempt to settle question-
able claims. A company is privileged to perform acts that will cause emotional distress
as long as it acts in good faith and in a reasonable manner. Privilege will not arise if
there is not a good faith dispute, since the law does not encourage settlement of nonexis-
tent disputes. Id. at 396. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
54. One of the losses in Fletcher was real estate on which payments could not be
maintained. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 88. If this were the only
injury, intentional infliction of emotional distress would not be available as an action.
55. The determinative factor should be whether or not the prima facie case was met.
Third parties suing because of nonpayment on liability policies would often be unsuc-
cessful due to the defense of privilege, which arises when a claim is in legitimate dispute.
The courts favor settlement negotiations in such cases. Id. at 395. 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89.
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not be held to as high a standard of care as when dealing directly
with an insured.56
The tort of interference with a protected property interest will be
applicable only for an insured's actions for nonpayment of benefits,
since it is based on the duty of good faith and fair dealing that arises
out of the contract. 57 Within that area, however, it has potential for
much broader, application than the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress because it requires neither extreme conduct nor se-
vere emotional harm.58 Based on its use in Fletcher, the required pat-
tern probably is an intentional or reckless, bad faith refusal to pay
insurance benefits when such refusal proximately causes injury to the
insured.5 9 The requirement of bad faith will exclude the great ma-
jority of wrongful nonpayments. 60 However, such a requirement
might eventually be dropped, as it has been by some statutes.61 It is likely
that this tort will be adopted in other jurisdictions. A majority of states
currently recognize a duty of good faith and fair dealing in the settle-
ment area of liability insurance and most classify violation of that
duty as a tort.62 Just as Fletcher extended Crisci, other courts can
make an extension to cover nonpayment of insurance benefits. 63
Neither intentional infliction of emotional distress nor interference
with a protected property interest should be limited to the disability
56. The standard of care in the nonpayment of benefits cases is based directly on the
insurer-insured relationship. Id. at 403, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 95. A third party lacks such spe-
cial consideration.
57. A similar duty of good faith and fair dealing does not arise without a contract.
Consequently, third parties negotiating on a liability policy could not use this tort.
58. Indeed, the reason the court gave for using this tort was to place emphasis on
economic injury. Fletcher, 10 Cal. App. 3d at 402, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 94.
59. Id. at 401-02, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94. Since bad faith is an element, the defense
of privilege is unnecessary. A company only has a privilege to engage in settlement
practices when there is a good faith dispute. Id. at 395-96, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 89-90.
60. 3 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1612 (1967).
61. In the settlement of liability claims a standard of reasonableness is now used, but
eventually it may be replaced by a strict liability standard. Crisci, 58 Cal. Rptr. 17, 426
P.2d 177. Comment, Crisci's Dicta of Strict Liability for Insurer's Failure to Settle: A
More Rational Settlement Behavior, 43 WASH. L. REV. 799 (1968). Already three states
do not require bad faith as a condition precedent to applying punitive statutes in the
nonpayment of benefits area. 3 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 1612
(1967).
62. See Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 168 (1955).
63. It is clearly established in Washington that liability insurers have a duty of good
faith to settle claims against insureds. Violation of that duty sounds in tort. Murray v.
Mossman, 56 Wn.2d 909, 355 P.2d 985 (1960). Tyler v. Grange Ins. Ass'n, 3 Wn. App.




insurance area. The special relationship and position of the parties is
the same in most kinds of insurance. Almost by definition, insurance
of any sort is purchased in recognition of the weakened position that a
particular type of misfortune may create.
With the development of "no fault" systems many more people will
soon be dealing with their own insurance companies in an adversary
relationship. Inevitably a few insurers will use their excessive power to
force unfair settlements on their insureds. The tort remedies of
Fletcher will provide aid for those injured by such practices and also
deter such practices in the future.
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